Political life after Covid-19

In a recent ‘long read’ written for the Guardian newspaper, Peter Baker concluded that ‘Covid-19 has revealed the political status quo to be broken.’ Intuitive responses to this claim will likely fall along traditional dividing lines. Voters and elected representatives on the Left have long held market-based governance strategies in contempt, highlighted the folly of spurning international cooperation (a la Brexit), and pointed out the weaknesses of an economy built upon social inequality. Those on the Right have been equally longstanding in their claims to competent stewardship of the UK economy, the need for strong national sovereignty and tight border controls, and the primacy of marketplace logic. Both with likely find vindication for these standpoints in the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic, which not only threatens our individual health but also exposes uncomfortable and inconvenient truths about the legitimacy of political structures, institutions and a range of fundamental values.

It is possible, however, that the havoc wrought by Covid-19 may also pull actors on the Left and Right back from the growing ideological polarity that has characterised political debate in recent years. The Right will be forced to acknowledge the importance of the state (and particularly well-funded public services) as the de facto underwriter of national stability in times of crisis and as the guarantor of those communities and individuals with most to lose. The Left, likewise, will need to acknowledge the draw-backs of large-scale structural reform agendas outside of crises and, in turn, accept the need for more prudent Keynesian demand management in an uncertain future. In sum, insofar as we can look tentatively to ‘political life after Covid’, it is possible that this pandemic offers a unique opportunity for the UK and other states to work with political consensus in order to redesign social norms, political practices, and governance structures in a way that transcends rather than divides along existing fault lines. The success of such an enterprise will likely rely upon the form of such a recalibration as well as its substance.

In this respect at least, democratic systems should be well suited in a way that they are not necessarily prepared to give authoritative responses at the height of a crisis. When a crisis strikes, the delicate political, moral and legal order of liberal democracies — such as rule of law, legitimate political opposition, well established accountability structures, well developed links between policy makers and experts ‘on the ground’, and a free press — make it extremely difficult for political leaders to jump to quick and otherwise draconian measures (such as enforced social lockdown) to contain urgent threats.

At the same time, these mechanisms are assets in a post-crisis period of reflection, when public policy must focus on repairing the damage of one crisis and work on prevention and preparedness for the next one. If these vehicles of democratic power are utilised correctly in the aftermath of Covid-19, then they must bring the wider public into the discourse and design of the post-crisis response. Importantly, those processes must also reflect the various inequalities in the impact of this pandemic upon different social and demographic groups.

Political life after Covid-19 will also likely produce a normative reflection on the structure of our occupational world and raise questions about not only how we work, but also who our key workers are and how they should be rewarded in an otherwise free-market economy. Given that pandemics like Covid-19 do not respect the imagined realities of capitalism and its associated social markers and borders, there may well be a stark awakening in the public and political psyche akin to that caused by similar critical junctures like the Great Depression and World War II. Put simply, Covid-19 may refocus attention on a simple truth: that in order to protect everyone in a crisis, social structures and social security need to be robust for allcitizens.

It has, for example, become starkly apparent in recent days that unemployment benefits need to be sufficient to support those who are most exposed to health pandemics and who otherwise have no choice but to flout public health guidelines in search of income. The notion of a government-funded universal basic income that secures everyone’s access to basic necessities in times of hardship is no longer a new idea, but Covid-19 may push it up the policy agenda for practical consideration. At the same time, it is clear that digital infrastructures need to be improved and democratised in a way that gives everyone access to effective internet connections at home and, in turn, enables them to work flexibly during public health emergencies.

Governments and big business also need to develop long-term contingencies and investment strategies that look beyond the next quarter’s fiscal growth figures to safeguard particular domains of human activity. And countries like the UK will need to look outside of themselves to engage in unparalleled levels of international cooperation. Indeed, if Covid has taught us anything, it is that the domino-effect of transboundary crises can occur very quickly. Climate change is, to some extent, a pertinent known unknownin this respect. The international community is fully aware that climate change is an impending global crisis and that the activities of one nation will define the suffering or survival of others. Yet in the complacency of the here and now, we are yet to reach a global consensus on how best to avoid the metaphorical pile-up hurtling towards us. Covid-19 may well shatter that complacency.

At its best, then, political life after Covid-19 will be defined by political consensus-building within and across partisan and non-partisan groups alike. At its best, it will be defined by compassionate governance and it will mobilise democratic apparatus to construct appropriate future-proofing policy proposals. And at its best, it will be defined by international collaboration without economic self-interest. This may be an overly quixotic projection and it is worth considering the other side of the coin. At its worst, political life after Covid-19 will become a morality play in which political elites claim credit or eschew blame, and in which partisan politicking operationalises the crisis for electoral gain. At its worst, the shadow of nationalism cast by post-millennial populism will grow stronger and governments will retreat in on themselves in protectionist moves to mitigate the domestic effects of future crises. And at its worst, we will forget this crisis all too soon in our collective hankering for a return to normality.